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**THE INFLUENCE OF DAVĀNĪ'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT ON MULLA ŞADRĀ'S
PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Soul was the topic of discussion before MullaŞadrā in the natural philosophy. The fruits of his soulology are to transfer them to the section of theology in more general. In the discussion of incorporeity of the soul from its corporeal origination to the heavenly survival and reaching the peak of perfection, the unity of soul and intelligence has made this transition possible. The method of Allama Davānī has had a significant impact on Şadr-ol-Mote'allehin's thought.

Keywords: Soul, corporeal origination, heavenly survival, the unity of soul and intelligence

INTRODUCTION

Referring to Davānī's opinions, we come to a better understanding of them, and then when we review MullaŞadrā's opinions in each and every single of common cases, the efficacy of Davānī's opinions on MullaŞadrā will be in better evaluation. One of the most important of these turning points is to transfer the soulology from the section of physics to the section of philosophical theology by Şadr-ol-Mote'allehin. Furthermore it takes the

relationship between philosophy, mysticism and religion into consideration.

The relation of Şadrā's ontology and the proposition of soul

Şadr-ol-Mote'alleh in Shīrāzī believes system of being has a longitudinal layout and levels. Şadr-ol-Mote'alleh in divides the levels of being into three ones of substratum, analogy and intelligence and believes that the hierarchies of the soul of human are in the very three-level division as well.

MullaṢadrāShīrāzī's general attitude toward the proposition of evolution and perception and acquisition of the soul to the intellectual world is founded on his view to ontology. Ṣadr-ol-Mote'alleh in believes that the achievement of soul to the intellectual world does not mean to abstract current features of concrete and perception in general, insomuch as the Peripatetic School believes in it, but it means to transfer the soul from the material existence to the intellectual one, moreover, this transfer is done as the result of the transfer of soul to the sense and then the transfer to the imagination and ultimately the transfer of soul to the intelligence. In the world of intellect, the soul unifies abstractions in an existential unity and witnesses them;

«بل معناه نقله عن الوجود المادّي إلى الوجود العقليّ بواسطة نقله أولاً إلى الحسّ، ثم إلى الخيال، ثم إلى العقل»
 “Bal Ma‘nāhunaqlah‘anil-wujūdi-l-māddūla-l-wujūdi-l-‘aqlībiwāsāṭatannaqlīhāwwalanilal-ḥis, thummailal-khīyōl, thummailal-‘aql”

«But it means its transfer from the material existence to the intellectual one at first due to its transfer to the sense, then to the imagination, and then to the intelligence» (See: MullaṢadrā, *Al-Hikma al-muta‘aliya*, vol. 3, p. 35).

The human soulology, the path of theology and cosmology

Ṣadr-ol-Mote'alleh in Shīrāzī believes that the soul is a part of the system of being and a part of an interconnected whole, so that the soul is a part of the universe of possibilities and has a solid relation with other parts of the world. At that it is a necessary being along with other parts and has a permanent poverty apropos of it. MullaṢadrā's ontology guides an Adam-related through cosmology and theology, and his anthropology leads a wisdom-seeker to soulology, the knowledge of origin and end, weal and woe and the signs of itinerary of spiritual path. (‘Uyūn Masā’il al-Nafs, Hasanzadeh Āmoli, Hassan, Amīr Kabīr Publications Institute, Tehran, 1992, pp. 297-298)

Allama Davānī and the heavenly entity of soul and the difference with the Transcendent Philosophy (Al-Hikma al-muta‘aliya)

The leading philosopher Davānī believes the soul is attached to human and brings some demonstrable, exemplary and conscientious evidences forward to prove. He knows about the stability of self being by the intuitive knowledge and has repeatedly mentioned it in his writings and considers it as the basis of self-knowledge. In his view, the soul of human is not a material reality but a reality

detachment from substratum and introduces the intelligence as its origin (Šawākel al-ḥūr, p. 186)

From Davānī's vantage point, the immaterial-intellective soul is emanated from the active intellect upon the body and belongs to the category of congenital lights. Therefore, the soul is an immaterial substance ab initio the first attachment to the body and at the beginning of the early stages; still, for the intellective soul does not belong to originated abstractions exempted from faculty and defect since the original creation, it has been originated by contingencies of substratum and its perfections belongs to a posterior period than its entity and in order to complete them it needs corporeal instruments and equipment that prepares it to gain emanation out of intellectual substances; hence, the intellective soul is free from substratum according to the entity not to the act (Davānī; Šadr-od-din Shīrāzī, 1958, the Fourth Journey, vol. 2, p. 112), when the soul is brought to perfection, there will be no need for the body and its instruments.

Davānī does not attribute the vegetable and animal soul to being free from corporeality and not believe in their resurrection, still Šadr-ol-Mote'alleh in believes in incorporeity of the vegetable and animal soul and also attributes the resurrection to them. Jalāluddīn

Davānī ponders over the issue of incorporeity of the soul like Mulla Šadrā's view to some degree.

Davānī's argument over ascertainment of incorporeity of intellective soul

Davānī says "the universal intelligibles" is the percept of soul as an abstract matter and indivisible. On the one hand, the indivisibility may not infuse into the matter of divisibility, for in this case it must receive the division; as a result, the soul is indivisible as a reality that the universal intelligibles infuse into it, and inasmuch as the divisibility belongs solely to the substratum, the soul would be free from substratum; furthermore, another reason is that because the body is constantly changing, the soul is always constant. On the other hand, we know that a variable matter is other thing than the constant one, as such, the soul is a constant matter apart from the body which is a variable one. (Šawākel al-ḥūr, p. 125)

Davānī's special reason for ascertainment of incorporeity of intellective soul

Another Davānī's special reason related to this subject is that human is able to perceive different perceptual data. On the one hand, the body has no exhaustive identity other than gathering these organs, nevertheless, human attributes all cognitions to an "I" - I hear, I see -, it indicates that human has an exhaustive

and single identity which is apart from the body and that is the human soul, and it has the simple-single identity contrary to action multiplicity and this may not be ascertained unless the immateriality of human soul (‘Ilmu-n-nafs, p. 2)

The leading philosopher Davānī in another reason emphasizes that the ego-human and the human soul is always percipient and omniscient of self, however, human is not like that and is not such aware of self gradually, so it suggests the soul is other than the body. (Šawākel al-ḥūr, p. 122)

MullaŠadrā and the corporeality of origination and the spirituality of immortality of soul

He believes there is no existence for the soul apart from the body, and both have come to existence with a single being. From Šadr-ol-Mote'allehin's vantage point, the soul is in possession of the body after origination. The body is not the bearer of the soul, but the soul is the bearer of the body and bears it with self. (Al-Hikma al-muta‘aliya fi-l-asfar al-‘aqliyya al-arba‘a, vol. 9, pp. 47&55).

MullaŠadrā considers the human soul as the corporeality of origination and the spirituality of immortality of soul, whereas, Davānī believes the spirituality of origination and the immortality of intellectual soul.

Davānī does not attribute the vegetable and animal soul to being free from corporeality and not maintain on their resurrection, yet Šadr-ol-Mote'alleh in Shīrāzī maintains on immortality of the vegetable and animal soul and attributes the resurrection to them as well.

The stages of incorporeity of the intellectual soul in the Transcendent Philosophy and Davānī's view, the leading philosopher, about it

Intellectual soul falls into three stages which respectively are: purgatorial incorporeity, intellectual perfect incorporeity and incorporeity of atom.

Purgatorial incorporeity: the intellectual soul is of the imperfect in corporeity or purgatorial incorporeity at the stage of imagination according to MullaŠadrā, it means that the soul is immaterial and exempted from the corporeal matter not quantitative form in the station of actual imagination— whether in entity or in practice.

In purgatorial incorporeity discussion, the results of Šadr-ol-Mote'allehin Shīrāzī's view are envisaged that if a soul does not reach the stage of intellectual celibacy and is taken away the body at the stage of imagination, it will not be vanished, because it has an unphysical substance.

At that, Jalāluddīn Davānī does not maintain on the immateriality of the faculty of

imagination and considers it as something material, and it is one of the points that distinguishes him from Ṣadr-ol-Mote'alleh in Shīrāzī.

In Ṣadr-ol-Mote'alleh in Shīrāzī' view, regarding to the assertion of abstraction of imagination, the arbitrariness of assertion is in animals' incorporeity of souls, for animals are of actual *virtus imaginativa* (Ṣadr-od-din Shīrāzī, 1958, the Fourth Journey, vol. 2, pp. 111-112, Ibid, 1967, p. 197; Sabzivārī, 1298, p. 287)

Intellectual perfect incorporeity of intellectual soul: it means being void of the corporal matter and quantitative form in entity and in act.

Incorporeity of atom: at this stage, the soul is also immaterial of essence as well as free from corporeality. Suhrawardī has pointed out to this meaning in the book *al-Talwīḥūt* (The Intimations). (Quoted Ṣadr-od-din Shīrāzī, 1957, the First Journey, vol. 1, p. 43)

Mulla Ṣadrā also believes if the soul is of essence, it is necessary to be a fixed matter, because the essence suggests that there is the limit, failure, weaknesses, deficiencies and no doubt and difference in the object.

Then it can be said that Mulla Ṣadrā and the leading philosopher Davānī are of close reflection on this theory, and Ṣadr-ol-

Mote'allehin, however, does not refer to Davānī's idea, he is touched by his opinion.

Soul in the stages of perfection

Allama Davānī says the whole pre-perfections has come together in the human emanation which is the most noble of kinds of animal is; thus, the sacred intellect *virtus* which is the origin of creation is appeared in the human kind like the acquired intelligence, when the human soul is manifested in this stage, it is connected to the sublime world which is the stage of intelligence, and the point of end conforms to the preparation. (Akhlaq-e Jalali, p. 261)

Davānī and Ṣadrā's opinions are similar in the fact that it is feasible for the soul to be perfected, in addition it may be said that Davānī has had an influence on Ṣadrā on this point, though, it is not specially for Davānī.

Nonetheless, how the soul may be perfected is the difference point between Davānī and Ṣadrā, Ṣadr-ol-Mote'alleh in Shīrāzī believes the soul in substantial motion ascends from the stage of its materiality and bodily origination to the level of incorporeity and intelligence and can even reaches the station of divinity further ahead; however, the leading philosopher Davānī believes the soul evolution is to journey to the world of incorporeity and intelligence by the soul. Consequently, Allama Davānī does not have

any influence on MullaṢadrā about the issue of soul evolution, he himself is the creator of a new theory “The Substantial Motion of soul”.

MullaṢadrā and the issue of soul evolution

Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī believes in corporeality of origination and spirituality of immortality of intellectual soul, besides he maintains on the substantial motion of intellectual soul from material level to the level of intellect which is completely inconsistent with Davānī's opinion.

Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehin, Ibn Sīnā and Davānī are of like mind about in that the soul is not eternal but being contingent, they are not of the same opinion on how the origination happens and the relationship of soul is.

Substantiality of soul

The leading philosopher Davānī believes that the soul is an essence that does not take any sensible indication and captures bodies (Ṣawākel al-hūr, p. 186). In order to ascertain this essence, intuitive and immediate matter is introduced by him (Ibid, P. 231), so he does not provide a proof to ascertain the substantiality of soul which is one of the distinguishing points of him with MullaṢadrā. At that, Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī propounds another important point that the soul has the essential priority over the body and even the body is the reason. According to the leading

philosopher Davānī's view, this causal nexus may not be established because the body must ruin by the soul's vanishing, whereas, the soul goes away but the body has remained.

The union of soul with its percepts

Allama Davānī believes that the soul is the substance of all forms and the earth of all facts and introduces the appearance of all possibilities in the soul. (Al-zawrā', p.182). Davānī does not maintain on the union of the soul with its percepts, but he brings up the topic of intuitive knowledge of the soul that Mulla Ṣadrā receives it with approval and is inspired by it in his works.

The essence of ontological felicity and barriers to it

According to the author of article, the approach of the leading philosopher Davānī to anthropology and soulology is to look both at the Peripatetic school and mystical schools along with the school of Illuminationism, and naturally it will be discussed on the role of the soul of human in properties of the epiphany of Divine Names in this look. Davānī believes that the creation of the universe is for the sake of human being and human is the end of creation, and of course the primary end is the very universal human being and the Prophet (PBUH).

According to the view of Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī, if the soul of human is

perfected and has no interest for the body and refers to its real self, it will achieve a beatitude that is not comparable to sensible pleasure because the causes of pleasure are more fun.

Davānī believes a seeker moves such forward on the path of cognition that reaches the level of true unity and at that stage in his opinion there is nothing left and this is a supreme plenitude (Šawākel al-ḥūr, p. 176).

From Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī point of view, the very body and senses that were initially in need and through which the human being was reflecting about the universe and the origin and end, they are a hurdle in the end. (Ibid., vol.3, p. 396).

Davānī's point of view on the issue of end and the eternity of soul

Allama Davānī believes that the human soul does not go away and ruin after the death and decaying of the body and rotting of all organs. He provides a definite proof on this topic, still he thinks that its perception depends on the sound conscience. He has not separated two ranks of the ineffectiveness of corruption of body in the corruption of soul from the imperishability of soul in his opinions. The first and second definite proof is applied to prove the rank of imperishability of soul and the second definite proof is applied to the

rank of ineffectiveness of the corruption of body in the corruption of soul.

Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī and the proposition of end and permanence of infiniteness of soul

MullaṢadrā has the same idea on the permanence of infiniteness of soul as Davānī's, and it may note that Davānī's thought has an influence on MullaṢadrā's; however, as it was already mentioned, Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī is at issue with Allama Davānī over the resurrection of animal soul and vegetable one. Ṣadr-ol-Mote'allehinShīrāzī as well as Davānī believe the noetic level of soul actualizes and turns the soul to the intelligence as a result of the unity of the soul with the active intelligence (Al-Hikma al-muta'aliya, vol.9, p.143).

Another difference between MullaṢadrā's opinion and Allama Davānī according to what has in anticipation been quoted Davānī is that as the view of Mulla Ṣadrā on substantial motion the soul movement does not end from the material intellect to reaching the acquired intelligence, for the acquired intelligence and the fourth stage of the spiritual life of the soul is the very connection and union with the active intelligence or the very holy spirit (Al-Hikma al-muta'aliya fi-l-asfar al-'aqliyya al-arba'a, vol. 2, p.176).

Ṣadrā believes there is no end for the evolution of human soul and no limit to the evolutionary journey of soul

"إِنَّ النَّفْسَ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةَ لَيْسَ لَهَا مَقَامٌ مَعْلُومٌ فِي الْهَيَوِيَّةِ وَ لَا لَهَا دَرَجَةٌ مَعْتَبَةٌ فِي الْوُجُودِ كَسَائِرِ الْمَوْجُودَاتِ الطَّبِيعِيَّةِ وَالنَّفْسِيَّةِ وَالْعَقْلِيَّةِ الَّتِي كُلُّهَا مَقَامٌ مَعْلُومٌ، بَلِ النَّفْسُ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةُ ذَاتُ مَقَامَاتٍ وَ دَرَجَاتٍ مُتَقَاوَتَةٍ وَ لَهَا نَشْأَةٌ سَابِقَةٌ وَ لَاحِقَةٌ وَ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ مَقَامٍ وَ عَالَمٍ صُورَةٌ أُخْرَى"

"Inna-n-nafsa al-Insānīyya tanlaysalah āmaqāmun fi-l-huwāyyatanwalālahādarajatanmu‘ayyanatan fi-l-wujūdikasāiril-mujūdāti-ṭ-ṭabīyyiah wan-nafsiyyatanwal-‘aqliyyatanallatikullunlahū maqāmunma‘lūmun, bali-n-nafsal-insānīyyatandhātamaqāmātwadarajātmutifāwatanwalahānasha‘tunsābiqatanwalāḥiqatanwalahāfīkullumaqāmunwa‘ālamunṣūratanukhrā"

Indeed the human soul has no known status in identity, and no certain rank in existence like all other natural, mental and spiritual beings that he has all definite status, rather the soul of human has a variety of statuses and ranks, and for him is the former and posterior creation, and for him is the latter form in all status and world (Ibid, al-Hikma al-muta‘aliya, vol. 8, p. 343).

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